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PAY THE TROLL TOLL:  THE PATENT TROLL 
MODEL IS FUNDAMENTALLY AT ODDS 
WITH THE PATENT SYSTEM’S GOALS 
OF INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 
Grace Heinecke* 
 
“Patents are supposed to protect intellectual property and spur innovation, 
and once upon a time in America they did.  But like everything else the 
legal system touches nowadays, U.S. patent law has been hijacked so that 
it now operates nearly in reverse, deterring research and penalizing 
innovation.”1 
 
Patent litigation has multiplied sixfold since the 1980s, with the last few 
years seeing an unprecedented number of patent lawsuits.  When an 
inventor receives a patent, the U.S. Constitution grants him a monopoly for 
a limited number of years to reward him for his investment of time and 
resources and to incentivize him to continue innovating, which ultimately 
benefits society.  However, the emergence of a litigious character, deemed 
the “patent troll,” has led to the patent system’s hindrance of innovation, a 
result that is at odds with the primary goal of patent law.  Patent trolls 
exploit weaknesses in the patent system in a number of manners:  they 
assert overly broad patents to force companies into financial settlements 
because these companies cannot afford the cost of litigation; they deter 
innovative companies from investing in research and development through 
the threat of litigation; and they do not practice the patents they hold, thus 
contributing no innovation in the advancement of technology and 
immunizing themselves from countersuit.  In addition, trolls exhibit 
anticompetitive behavior, a trend that has caught the eye of the Federal 
Trade Commission.  This Note provides a survey of the modern patent 
landscape, addressing certain areas of the patent system that patent trolls 
are able to use to their advantage.  This Note then advocates that the 
Federal Trade Commission play a more integral role in curbing 
anticompetitive troll behavior and proposes several methods of patent 
reform. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2016, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2009, University of 
Pennsylvania.  I would like to thank my parents and uncle for their continuous love and 
support. 
 
 1. Editorial, Patently Absurd, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 1, 2006, 12:01 AM), http://online. 
wsj.com/articles/SB114117826666886050 [http://perma.cc/UDR3-M6Y9]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The patent system in the United States is fundamentally flawed and 
requires comprehensive reform.2  In the past decade, the United States has 
seen the rise of a bully in the patent system:  the patent troll.  Patent trolls 
exploit many weaknesses in the system, including the Patent and Trademark 
Office’s (USPTO) inundation of patent applications, overly broad patents, 
and procedural advantages for plaintiffs in lawsuits, among others.3  Trolls 
use these weaknesses to extract licensing fees through the threat of 
litigation.4  Troll behavior has harmed innovation, which directly conflicts 
with the patent system’s goal of fostering innovation.5 
Peter Detkin, then in-house counsel for Intel, coined the term “patent 
troll” in the late 1990s.6  Many use the term “patent-assertion entity” (PAE) 
instead of “patent troll,”7 but the two are synonymous and used 
interchangeably.8  According to a recent White House report, trolls “focus 
on aggressive litigation,” using such tactics as “threatening to sue thousands 
of companies at once, without specific evidence of infringement against any 
of them; creating shell companies that make it difficult for defendants to 
know who is suing them; and asserting that their patents cover inventions 
not imagined at the time they were granted.”9 
Patent lawsuits have multiplied sixfold since the 1980s.10  Trolls file 
about 62 percent of all new patent infringement lawsuits,11 even though 
trolls lose 92 percent of the time when their suits reach a judgment on the 
 
 2. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 114-235, at 27 (2015) (“The inefficiencies and inequities 
currently afflicting the Nation’s patent-enforcement system are a problem that calls for this 
Committee’s attention.”). 
 3. See infra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of weaknesses in the patent system that trolls 
exploit. 
 4. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of common patent-troll behavior. 
 5. See infra Part II.B.3.a for an overview of several recent studies that evaluate trolls’ 
impact on innovation. 
 6. See When Patents Attack!, THIS AM. LIFE (July 22, 2011), http://www. 
thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/transcript [http://perma.cc/3GKD-62ZH].  
After spending years fighting off patent trolls at Intel, Detkin now aggressively supports the 
role of patent trolls. Id.  See infra Part II.A for a discussion of Intellectual Ventures, a 
company Detkin cofounded in 2000, which many now consider to be one of the foremost 
patent trolls today; see also infra Part II.C for an overview of patent-troll supporters and their 
response to the growing criticism of troll tactics. 
 7. The White House, for example, uses the term PAE. See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION (2013), http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/9D7G-38FB].  Jon Leibowitz, 
the former chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), also opted to use the term 
“PAE” in a 2012 workshop hosted by the FTC and the Department of Justice (DOJ). FTC & 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES ACTIVITIES WORKSHOP 3–4 (2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2012/12/patent-assertion-entity-activities-
workshop [http://perma.cc/6EK7-F8W8]. 
 8. This Note primarily uses the term “patent troll” for consistency and clarity, but the 
use of “patent troll” conveys the same idea as others’ use of “PAE.” 
 9. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 7, at 1. 
 10. James Bessen, The Evidence Is in:  Patent Trolls Do Hurt Innovation, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Nov. 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/07/the-evidence-is-in-patent-trolls-do-hurt-
innovation/ [https://perma.cc/VYL3-RP4M]. 
 11. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 7, at 5. 
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merits.12  Recent studies also indicate that patent trolls impose huge costs 
on defendant firms.13  Each year, defendants facing patent litigation spend 
nearly $30 billion in direct out-of-pocket costs.14  It is further estimated that 
patent litigation costs more than $60 billion in wealth per year due to 
foregone innovation and product development.15 
Every branch of the government—the President,16 Congress,17 and the 
U.S. Supreme Court18—is now paying close attention to the patent-
litigation explosion and the ways that trolls exploit weaknesses in the patent 
system.  Lawmakers must attempt to resolve the inherent tension between 
curbing the abuses of patent trolls while allowing legitimate owners to 
protect their patents.  The best remedy, therefore, will not jeopardize the 
protections already in place for innovators.  To address the trolling problem 
in a way that protects both inventors and the public good, it is imperative 
that lawmakers continue to foster innovation and competition through the 
patent system. 
Part I of this Note describes the origins of patent law, the system’s filing 
requirements, and patent law’s policy goals. Part I then surveys recent 
trends in the patent system, including legislation and recent Supreme Court 
cases affecting the modern patent landscape.  Part I also addresses the 
Innovation Act of 2015 and the Protecting American Talent and 
Entrepreneurship Act of 2015 (PATENT Act), the most recently proposed 
major pieces of patent legislation.  Part II introduces the reader to patent 
trolls and analyzes their behavior and common litigation techniques.  This 
part also summarizes several recent academic studies of trolls’ impact on 
innovation.  Part II then discusses the anticompetitive nature of patent trolls, 
beginning with a general discussion of competition law and how it interacts 
with patent law, followed by an analysis of the Federal Trade 
Commission’s (FTC) interest in patent trolls.  Part III explores several other 
conventional steps to remedy parts of the patent system that trolls exploit.  
This part also proposes more hands-on involvement by the FTC and the 
stricter use of antitrust law to better police those taking advantage of the 
current patent system. 
 
 12. See FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 5. 
 13. In early 2014, one firm even began offering insurance plans so companies could 
better protect themselves from trolls. See Joe Mullin, Startups Can Now Buy Insurance 
Against Threat of Patent Trolls, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 11, 2014, 4:00 PM), http:// 
arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/11/startups-can-now-buy-insurance-against-threat-of-
patent-trolls/ [http://perma.cc/39YJ-C287]. 
 14. See Bessen, supra note 10. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 7. 
 17. See infra Part I.C.1 (discussing patent-reform legislation). 
 18. In its most recent Term (2013–2014), the Supreme Court granted certiorari to six 
cases raising patent issues. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2014 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 
2 (2014), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-patent-
litigation-study.pdf [http://perma.cc/QK4U-LCTP].  For a discussion of notable rulings from 
that Term, see infra Part I.C.2.b–c. 
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I.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 
Part I.A discusses the constitutional origins of patent law and the 
statutory requirements for filing a patent.  This part also surveys the policy 
goals of patent law and discusses why patents continue to play a vital role 
in modern technological advancement.  Part I.B explores the modern patent 
landscape, describing legislation and important Supreme Court rulings. 
A.  The Constitutional Origins of Patent Law 
and the System’s Filing Requirements 
The protection of patents in the United States dates back to the country’s 
Founding.19  In The Federalist Papers, James Madison expressed support 
for this protection:  “The right to useful inventions seems . . . to belong to 
the inventors.  The public good fully coincides . . . with the claims of 
individuals.”20  The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”21  Congress exercised this power by creating the 
federal patent system.  A patent is a temporary government grant “of the 
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the 
invention throughout the United States.”22  While monopolies are generally 
not favored under U.S. law, they are granted to inventors to encourage 
innovation and protect creative ideas.23 
In exchange for a twenty-year monopoly, the inventor must file a 
specification with the USPTO,24 and the invention must meet several 
requirements.  First, the specification must include a written description in 
terms clear enough that “any person skilled in the art” could make or use 
the invention relying solely upon the specification.25  It must also include at 
least one claim that identifies the elements that the “inventor regards as the 
invention.”26  Second, the invention must fall under the umbrella of 
patentable subject matter, identified in the U.S. Code as “any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof.”27  Third, the specification must 
demonstrate the invention’s utility—i.e., why it is useful.28  Fourth, the 
 
 19. The Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution was passed unanimously at the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787. See Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly 
Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909, 
922–23 (2002). 
 20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 307 (James Madison) (Cynthia Brantley Johnson ed., 
2004). 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 22. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). 
 23. See PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:  PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 
103 (6th ed. 2004). 
 24. The USPTO is a federal administrative agency to which Congress has granted the 
power to issue patents. 35 U.S.C. § 2. 
 25. Id. § 112(a). 
 26. Id. § 112(b). 
 27. Id. § 101. 
 28. Id. 
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claimed invention must meet the novelty requirement:  that the invention 
has not previously been patented, sold, or otherwise known to the public.29  
Finally, the invention must pass the test for nonobviousness, such that the 
invention would not have been obvious to “a person having ordinary skill in 
the art” prior to the specification’s filing date.30 
B.  Patent Law’s Policy Goals 
Through the grant of a temporary monopoly for patentable inventions, 
patent law incentivizes inventors to create innovative products,31 which in 
turn spur economic growth and advance technology.32  Thus, inventors and 
society are rewarded in a complementary manner:  society accepts the 
inventor’s temporary monopoly in exchange for higher levels of innovation 
and, consequently, greater rates of economic growth.33  Economic policies 
play an important role in the patent system.  Because the cost of copying an 
invention is only a fraction of the cost of developing the invention, patent 
law aims to protect the original investment of time and resources.34  In this 
way, patent law incentivizes research and development.  This does not 
mean that no other company can use the patented material during the 
twenty-year period; others can use the patented technology as long as they 
receive a license from the patent owner.35  When others build off of existing 
patents, this results in more innovation as other companies create new 
products and services.36 
However, the limits of patent rights must be clearly defined.  The 
Supreme Court has stated, “The monopoly is a property right; and like any 
property right, its boundaries should be clear.  This clarity is essential to 
promote progress, because it enables efficient investment in innovation.”37  
By granting property rights to patent owners, the patent system allows 
 
 29. Id. § 102. 
 30. Id. § 103. 
 31. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (“The patent laws 
promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to 
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development.”). 
 32. See id. (“The productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society 
through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, 
and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens.”). 
 33. See HAZEL V.J. MOIR, PATENT POLICY AND INNOVATION:  DO LEGAL RULES DELIVER 
EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC OUTCOMES? 1 (2013) (noting that “[i]f induced innovations generate 
new knowledge and know-how[,] this provides benefits that spill over to the community to 
offset the costs of the granted monopolies”). 
 34. Id. at 13 (observing that “[o]nce an innovator has developed a new art[i]fact or 
process, competitors are able to replicate this at very low cost, undercutting the original 
innovator in the market”). 
 35. See infra Part II.B.1, II.B.4.c (discussing cross-licensing). 
 36. See PHIL GOLDBERG, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., STUMPING PATENT TROLLS ON THE 
BRIDGE TO INNOVATION 2 (2013), http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2013/09/10.2013-Goldberg_Stumping-Patent-Trolls-On-The-Bridge-To-Innovation.pdf 
(“The goal of the American patent system is to encourage inventors to publicly disclose how 
their inventions work in their patent applications so that others can understand and build off 
their technologies in an effort to quicken innovation.”) [http://perma.cc/9PLG-6VNZ]. 
 37. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730–31 
(2002). 
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inventors to exclude others for a period of twenty years.  But when patent 
owners use excessive litigation to assert overly broad patents, they assert 
their rights in a manner that is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of 
this property right:  they may actually hinder innovation because defendants 
must reallocate resources to litigation, reducing spending on research and 
development.38  The White House has observed, “[p]atent policy must 
navigate a fine line” because “[i]nnovators who fear inadvertently 
infringing existing patents may reduce innovative activity or take costly 
steps to defend against lawsuits claiming infringement, leading to fewer 
resources available for wages, job creation, and innovation of new products 
and services.”39  Thus, the growing number of companies that exist solely 
to assert infringement claims may be incompatible with the patent system’s 
goal of protecting innovators who contribute to society with their 
inventions.40 
C.  The Modern Patent Landscape 
In 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act41 (AIA), 
a statute that many deem the most important patent reform since the 
1950s.42  Part I.C.1.a analyzes in detail the AIA’s changes to the patent 
system.  While the AIA did provide a much needed overhaul of U.S. patent 
law, many believe that it did not go far enough and have proposed further 
reform.43  Part I.C.1.b discusses the Innovation Act of 201544 and the 
PATENT Act,45 the most recent patent reform bills before Congress.  The 
modern patent landscape also has been further refined by several important 
Supreme Court rulings.  Part I.C.2 analyzes some of those cases. 
1.  Patent Legislation 
In the early 2000s, many lawmakers began to call for patent reform.46  
After several failed attempts, Congress ultimately passed the AIA in 2011.  
The AIA introduced several reforms including the first-to-file system, 
procedural shifts, and greater transparency in the system. 
 
 38. See infra Part II.B.3.a (discussing trolls’ impact on innovation). 
 39. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 7, at 2. 
 40. See infra Part III. 
 41. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 42. See Nathan Hurst, How the America Invents Act Will Change Patenting Forever, 
WIRED (Mar. 15, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/03/america-invents-act/all/ 
(identifying the AIA as “the biggest shakeup at the USPTO since 1952”) 
[http://perma.cc/8RFZ-UEC4]. 
 43. See infra Part I.C.1.b. 
 44. Innovation Act of 2015, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (as reported by House, July 29, 2015). 
 45. PATENT Act, S. 1137, 114th Cong. (as reported by Senate, Sept. 8, 2015). 
 46. Congress introduced patent-reform legislation in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010; 
however, none of these bills passed. See Hung H. Bui, An Overview of Patent Reform Act of 
2011:  Navigating the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Including Effective Dates for Patent 
Reform, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 441, 442–43 (2011). 
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a.  The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) 
The AIA provided several major shifts in the area of patent law.47  
Perhaps the most notable shift was the adoption of a first-to-file system.48  
Prior to the AIA, the United States observed a first-to-invent system.49  
Supporters of the AIA believe that the adoption of a first-to-file rule 
provides more certainty for inventors and also decreases the need for 
litigation to determine the filer’s subjective state of mind that may be 
necessary under a first-to-invent rule.50  The ease of a first-to-file system 
also has the capacity to speed up the patent review process at the already 
congested USPTO.51  Additionally, most other countries follow the first-to-
file rule; therefore, the AIA’s adoption of this rule puts the U.S. system in 
sync with the global trend.52  However, critics note that the first-to-file rule 
could pose a problem for small inventors who must first secure funding 
before they can file, placing them at a disadvantage compared to companies 
that have easy access to financial assets.53  Another potential downside of a 
first-to-file rule is the possibility that inventors will rush to file without 
properly refining the patent.54 
The AIA also introduced several procedural shifts.  The AIA created a 
new two-part standard for the joinder of defendants:  defendants will be 
joined if “(1) any right to relief is asserted against the parties jointly, 
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and “(2) 
questions of fact common to all defendants or counterclaim defendants will 
arise in the action.”55  The House Report indicates that the drafters of this 
provision intended to address the problem of forum shopping, which often 
occurs through the joinder of dozens of defendants who have only “tenuous 
connections to the underlying disputes in patent infringement suits.”56  
 
 47. See Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its 
Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 4 (2012) (providing a detailed analysis of the 
AIA’s “comprehensive reform of the law of patentability and patent enforceability” and the 
AIA’s “dramatic changes to the role of the public in the patenting process”). 
 48. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011).  This provision took effect eighteen months after the AIA was passed, applying only 
to patent applications with filing dates on or after March 16, 2013. See U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, AMERICA INVENTS ACT:  EFFECTIVE DATES 6 (2011), http://www.uspto. 
gov/aia_implementation/aia-effective-dates.pdf [http://perma.cc/LK6J-LKGQ]. 
 49. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3. 
 50. See, e.g., Paul R. Gupta & Alex Feerst, The U.S. Patent System After the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, 1 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 60, 60 (2012), http://www.orrick. 
com/Events-and-Publications/Documents/4466.pdf (noting that “[s]upporters of this shift 
claim that it will increase the certainty of issued patents and reduce the extent and cost of 
litigation over who was first to invent”) [http://perma.cc/6S4W-CQ3V]. 
 51. See Hurst, supra note 42. 
 52. See Gupta & Feerst, supra note 50, at 60 (also noting that the new system’s 
“harmonisation” with most other nations “will simplify and reduce the cost of gaining 
international patent protection”). 
 53. See Hurst, supra note 42. 
 54. See id.; see also infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing low-quality patents). 
 55. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 56. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 54 (2011). 
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Before the new joinder rules, patent trolls could more easily join together 
defendants in pro-plaintiff venues, such as the Eastern District of Texas.57 
Under the AIA, members of the public can have a much more hands-on 
role in the patent process.  Members of the public may now submit 
materials they deem relevant for a patent examiner to consider before 
issuing a patent.58  Additionally, once a patent has been issued, any member 
of the public may challenge the patent by filing a petition for post-grant 
review with the USPTO.59  Supporters of these new provisions believe that 
post-grant proceedings will decrease the amount of litigation and clarify the 
parameters of existing patents.60  The AIA provides some safeguards 
against abuse, requiring that a petition for post-grant review be filed no later 
than nine months after the date of the patent grant.61  However, inventors 
may face unexpected early costs if they are faced with a post-grant 
proceeding.62 
Finally, the AIA reformed business-method patents. While there is no 
widely established definition of a business-method patent,63 the USPTO has 
classified these patents as an “apparatus or method [that] is uniquely 
designed for or utilized in the practice, administration, or management of an 
enterprise, or in the processing of financial data.”64  The House Report 
indicates that these patents played a predominant role in the push for 
reform, noting that “the issuance of poor business-method patents during 
the late 1990’s through the early 2000’s led to the patent ‘troll’ lawsuits that 
compelled the Committee to launch the patent reform project.”65  The AIA 
established a transitional program for post-grant review of business-method 
patents.66  As is true with general post-grant review, any member of the 
public may challenge a business-method patent; however, the post-grant 
review for business methods is not limited to the nine-month window.67 
 
 57. See infra Part I.B.2.c (discussing filing concentration in the Eastern District of 
Texas). 
 58. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 8 (“Any third party may submit for 
consideration and inclusion in the record of a patent application, any patent, published patent 
application, or other printed publication of potential relevance to the examination of the 
application.”). 
 59. Id. § 6. 
 60. See Gupta & Feerst, supra note 50, at 62–63. 
 61. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 6. 
 62. See Gupta & Feerst, supra note 50, at 63. 
 63. See Lois Matelan, The Continuing Controversy over Business Method Patents, 90 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 125, 126 (2008). 
 64. See Class Definition for Class 705, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http:// 
www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc705/defs705.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) 
(emphasis omitted) [http://perma.cc/J6HJ-469J].  While there is a great deal of overlap 
between business-method patents and software patents, a business-method patent need not be 
implemented on a computer, though many are. See Matelan, supra note 63, at 127. 
 65. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 54 (2011). 
 66. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18. 
 67. Id. 
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It is also important to note that the AIA was silent on several crucial 
issues in the patent field, including damages and venue restrictions.68  
While prior patent-reform proposals contained provisions regarding venue 
and judges’ discretion in awarding damages, these issues were ultimately 
left out of the AIA.69 
b.  The Innovation Act of 2015 and the PATENT Act 
While the AIA provided much needed reform in a number of areas, many 
believe that it did not accomplish enough to remedy the patent system.70  
For example, President Obama has stated that the AIA “only went about 
halfway to where we need to go.”71  The Obama Administration has 
generally expressed support for further patent-reform legislation.72  
Currently, there is competing patent reform legislation before Congress:  
the Innovation Act of 2015,73 the latest bill before the House of 
Representatives, and the PATENT Act,74 the latest bill before the Senate. 
It is clear from the House Report for the Innovation Act of 2015 that 
lawmakers had patent trolls in mind while drafting the bill, and the 
legislation contains many key provisions designed to address troll 
behavior.75  The legislation’s first important provision is a heightened 
pleading requirement.76  Currently, a party alleging infringement need only 
name the relevant patents in the complaint—the Federal Circuit has stated 
that under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff in a patent 
infringement case need not “plead facts establishing that each element of an 
asserted claim is met” nor “even identify which claims it asserts are being 
 
 68. See Bui, supra note 46, at 445 n.35 (noting that “controversial provisions regarding 
damages apportionment, inequitable conduct, restriction on venue, and 18 month publication 
of all applications” were absent from the AIA); Gupta & Feerst, supra note 50, at 60 
(observing that the AIA left several “key issues (e.g. damages and venue) largely untouched 
and ripe for further judicial development”). 
 69. See Gupta & Feerst, supra note 50, at 64. 
 70. See, e.g., COALITION FOR PATENT FAIRNESS, COMMENTS OF COALITION FOR PATENT 
FAIRNESS ON DOJ/FTC WORKSHOP ON PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITIES 1 (2013), 
http://www.patentfairness.org/pdf/CPFcommentsOnPAEs.pdf (“But notwithstanding several 
improvements achieved by the America Invents Act, the U.S. patent system presents grave 
obstacles to innovation and competitiveness.”) [http://perma.cc/2FQR-8YGG].  The 
Coalition for Patent Fairness’s members are “a diverse group of companies dedicated to 
enhancing U.S. innovation, job creation, and competitiveness by strengthening our nation’s 
patent system.” Id. 
 71. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 7, at 3.  This report indicates that the 
need for further reform may be due to the fact that “the impact of aggressive litigation tactics 
by PAEs and others was not widely known during the seven years the AIA was under 
negotiation.” Id. 
 72. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY:  H.R. 
3309—INNOVATION ACT (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/ 
legislative/sap/113/saphr3309r_20131203.pdf [http://perma.cc/3XYQ-L98Q]. 
 73. Innovation Act of 2015, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (as reported by House, July 29, 2015). 
 74. PATENT Act, S. 1137, 114th Cong. (as reported by Senate, Sept. 8, 2015). 
 75. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-235, at 25 (2015) (discussing how patent troll litigation has 
“negatively affected small businesses”); id. at 27–28 (discussing fee-shifting and PAEs); id. 
at 41–43 (discussing discovery burdens as they relate to patent trolls). 
 76. See H.R. 9 § 3(a). 
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infringed.”77  However, the heightened initial pleading requirement under 
the Innovation Act would require greater specificity, mandating that the 
patent holder describe exactly how a patent is being infringed.78  The bill 
also contains provisions that would increase transparency in the patent 
system.79  For example, the bill requires that parties alleging infringement 
submit a list of all other complaints they have filed involving the same 
patent.80  The bill would also require plaintiffs to disclose the name of any 
“interested party” that has a financial interest in the patent or in the 
plaintiff.81  This provision aims to discourage the use of shell companies.82 
The Innovation Act also contains important fee-shifting provisions.  First, 
the bill makes it easier for a successful defendant to recover its litigation 
costs.83  Second, if a losing plaintiff is not able to pay an award, the bill 
allows the court to order others with a financial stake in the plaintiff’s 
lawsuit to join the lawsuit and pay the necessary legal fees.84  The bill also 
provides new rules for discovery that would delay the discovery phase of 
litigation until courts have interpreted the patent.85  This provision aims to 
address both the heavy burden that early discovery can place on defendants 
and the fact that this burden is usually shirked by trolls because trolls do not 
produce any goods, so their discovery burden is inherently lower.86  The 
Innovation Act also calls for the Director of the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts to “conduct a study of the prevalence of the 
practice of sending patent demand letters in bad faith and the extent to 
which that practice may, through fraudulent or deceptive practices, impose 
a negative impact on the marketplace.”87 
The PATENT Act contains many similar patent-reform provisions.  Like 
the Innovation Act, it includes heightened pleading requirements88 and 
 
 77. In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys., 681 F.3d 1323, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
 78. See H.R. 9 § 3(a). 
 79. See id. § 4. 
 80. See id. § 4(a). 
 81. Id. § 3(c). 
 82. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-235, at 35 (2015) (citing hearing testimony about trolls’ use 
of shell companies and noting “the difficulties posed when ownership and financial-interest 
information is withheld” because “defendants do not know whom they are negotiating with 
or who has the authority to settle the case”).  Shell companies are companies “which exist on 
paper only, with no real employees or offices.” Launderers Anonymous, ECONOMIST (Sept. 
22, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21563286 [http://perma.cc/9R4H-SCKL]; see 
also infra Part II.A (discussing shell companies as they relate to patent-troll behavior). 
 83. See H.R. 9 § 3(b) (“The court shall award, to a prevailing party, reasonable fees and 
other expenses incurred by that party in connection with a civil action in which any party 
asserts a claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, unless the 
court finds that the position and conduct of the nonprevailing party or parties were 
reasonably justified in law and fact or that special circumstances (such as severe economic 
hardship to a named inventor) make an award unjust.”). 
 84. See id. § 3(c). 
 85. See id. § 3(d). 
 86. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-235, at 41–43. 
 87. H.R. 9 § 8(e); see infra Part II.B.4.b (discussing demand letters). 
 88. See PATENT Act, S. 1137, 114th Cong. § 3(b) (as reported by Senate, Sept. 8, 
2015). 
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addresses transparency, requiring plaintiffs to identify any parties with a 
financial interest in the outcome of the case.89  The PATENT Act also 
contains fee-shifting reform, but there are important differences from the 
fee-shifting provisions of the Innovation Act.  The PATENT Act, like its 
counterpart before the House, allows a court to shift fees if the 
nonprevailing party’s position or conduct was not “objectively 
reasonable.”90  However, under the PATENT Act, the prevailing party 
bears “the burden of demonstrating that [it] is entitled to an award.”91  Like 
the Innovation Act, the PATENT Act would allow a defendant to identify 
“interested parties” that the court may hold financially accountable.92  The 
PATENT Act is less clear than the Innovation Act in defining the limits of 
discovery.  Rather than identifying explicit changes to discovery 
requirements, the bill merely identifies “types of discovery rules and 
procedures to be considered” by the Judicial Conference.93  The PATENT 
Act is, however, clearer in addressing demand letters.  While the Innovation 
Act simply calls for a study, the PATENT Act imposes civil penalties for 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in connection with abusive demand 
letters.”94 
While proponents of these bills believe that the legislation takes 
necessary steps to impede patent trolls,95 some critics also believe that the 
legislation goes too far.  For example, patent reform legislation prompted 
many large corporations to join together to create a lobbying group, called 
the Partnership for American Innovation, aimed at resisting some of the 
proposed reforms.96  The companies—which include Ford, Apple, and 
Pfizer—suggest that steps to curb patent trolls should be carefully 
considered because these changes can also inadvertently hurt truly 
innovative companies.97 
2.  Notable Supreme Court Rulings on Patent Law 
While the AIA provided several overdue changes in the patent field, 
many called for reform in the 2000s, years before the AIA became law.98  
During Congress’s years of inaction prior to the AIA’s passage, the 
 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. § 7(b). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. § 6(a)(3). 
 94. Id. § 9(a). 
 95. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, for one, has expressed support for both bills. 
See Stop Patent Trolls:  Support the Innovation Act of 2015, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://act.eff.org/action/stop-patent-trolls-support-the-innovation-act-of-2015 (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2015) [https://perma.cc/5323-3BQT]; Tell Your Senator to Support the PATENT 
Act, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://act.eff.org/action/tell-your-senator-to-support-the-
patent-act (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) [https://perma.cc/77WH-BPD2]. 
 96. See Diane Bartz, Apple, Pfizer, Others Form ‘Go Slow’ U.S. Patent Lobby Group, 
REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2014, 10:03 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/03/us-usa-
patents-lobbying-idUSBREA3210R20140403 [http://perma.cc/RE8P-QPYF]. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See supra note 46. 
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Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit99 stepped in and decided several 
cases that addressed many of the issues voiced in previous patent-reform 
bills that failed to pass.100  The Supreme Court has also addressed several 
patent issues in the post-AIA landscape, as many areas were either not 
addressed in the AIA or needed further clarification.  In its 2013–2014 
Term, the Supreme Court heard the highest proportion of intellectual 
property cases in its history.101  Six of those were patent cases.102 
a.  eBay:  Granting District Courts Greater Discretion 
to Issue Injunctions in Patent Infringement Cases 
Under the U.S. Code, courts may issue injunctions “in accordance with 
the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by 
patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”103  Prior to 2006, only 
in “rare instances” did courts deny permanent injunctions for allegations of 
patent infringement.104  However, the Supreme Court’s 2006 ruling in eBay 
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.105 held that the traditional equitable test must 
be applied in patent infringement cases.106 
This case arose out of a business-method patent107 held by 
MercExchange for online auction technology.108  MercExchange had 
approached eBay about licensing the patent to eBay, but these negotiations 
eventually dissipated.109  At that point, MercExchange sued for patent 
infringement.110  While a jury found MercExchange’s patent to be valid, the 
district court denied MercExchange permanent injunctive relief.111  The 
 
 99. The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over all patent appeals. See Court Jurisdiction, 
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/ 
court-jurisdiction (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/XEU6-NPHC]. 
 100. See Bui, supra note 46, at 442–45 (providing a discussion of the Patent Reform Acts 
of the 2000s that failed to pass and outlining several Supreme Court cases that altered the 
patent landscape during that time). 
 101. See Lawrence Hurley, U.S. High Court Sets Record for Intellectual Property 
Caseload, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2014, 1:03 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/27/ 
us-usa-court-ip-analysis-idUSBREA1Q09B20140227 [http://perma.cc/C4RY-NZQW]. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012). 
 104. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 105. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 106. Id. at 390.  Traditional equitable considerations that courts consider in deciding 
whether to grant injunctive relief include:  whether there has “been irreparable injury,” “the 
inadequacy of legal remedies,” and “the public consequences in employing the extraordinary 
remedy of injunction.” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). 
 107. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
 108. eBay, 547 U.S. at 390. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 390–91.  In its opinion, the district court seemed to suggest that MercExchange 
did, in fact, exhibit many characteristics of a patent troll.  Without explicitly using the terms 
“troll” or “PAE,” the district court based its decision not to grant injunctive relief on 
“[MercExchange]’s willingness to license its patents” and “its lack of commercial activity in 
practicing the patents,” ultimately concluding that MercExchange would not suffer 
irreparable harm if the court declined to issue an injunction. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, 
Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
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Federal Circuit reversed, applying its rule that courts will generally grant 
permanent injunctions in patent cases “absent exceptional 
circumstances.”112  The Supreme Court held that the traditional four-part 
equitable test, which all plaintiffs must satisfy when seeking a permanent 
injunction, must also be applied in patent cases.113  Under that test, a 
plaintiff must show that:  (1) he has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) 
remedies such as damages will not sufficiently compensate him for his 
injury; (3) under a consideration of the hardships of the plaintiff and 
defendant, an equitable remedy is appropriate; and (4) the public interest 
will not be harmed by a permanent injunction.114  Thus, the Court’s ruling 
reiterated the equitable discretion of district courts in granting or denying 
injunctive relief.115 
Some commentators believe that the eBay holding institutionally 
weakened patent trolls.116  Others counter that, upon closer inspection, eBay 
did not in fact reduce the momentum of trolls.117  Many researchers point 
out that the Court did not instruct the lower courts on how to apply the four-
part equitable relief test in patent cases.118  Further, if this lack of guidance 
causes lower courts to apply the test differently, then trolls can forum shop 
and are not significantly deterred by the ruling.119 
 
 112. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 
1339 (2005)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.  Courts have long used equitable considerations to “balance[] the conveniences of 
the parties and possible injuries to them according as they may be affected by the granting or 
withholding of the injunction.” Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944); see also 
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) (“These commonplace [equity] 
considerations applicable to cases in which injunctions are sought in the federal courts 
reflect a ‘practice with a background of several hundred years of history.’” (quoting Hecht 
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944))). 
 115. eBay, 547 U.S. at 394. 
 116. See Stephany A. Olsen LeGrand, eBay v. MercExchange:  On Patrol for Trolls, 44 
HOUS. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2007) (suggesting that the eBay ruling “empowered the lower 
courts to exercise their discretion . . . when the facts and circumstances of the case lend 
themselves to a suspicion of patent trolling or abuse of the patent system”); Jessica Holzer, 
Supreme Court Buries Patent Trolls, FORBES (May 16, 2006, 6:00 AM), http:// 
www.forbes.com/2006/05/15/ebay-scotus-patent-ruling-cx_jh_0516scotus.html (“The high 
court’s decision deals a blow to patent trolls, which are notorious for using the threat of 
permanent injunction to extort hefty fees in licensing negotiations as well as huge 
settlements from companies they have accused of infringing.”) [http://perma.cc/63V3-
PJTN]. 
 117. See, e.g., Damian Myers, Reeling in the Patent Troll:  Was eBay v. MercExchange 
Enough?, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 333, 348 (2007) (concluding that the ruling “will not likely 
reduce the power of the patent troll to a significant degree”); see also Thomas L. 
Casagrande, The Reach of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.:  Not Just for Trolls and 
Patents, 44 HOUS. LAW. 10, 16 (2006) (noting that “many were disappointed that the 
Supreme Court did not provide specific guidance about how courts should deal with ‘patent 
trolls’”). 
 118. See Paul M. Mersino, Patents, Trolls, and Personal Property:  Will eBay Auction 
Away a Patent Holder’s Right to Exclude?, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 307, 326 (2007); Myers, 
supra note 117, at 348. 
 119. See Myers, supra note 117, at 348. 
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b.  Alice:  Refining the Definition of Software Patents 
In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,120 the Supreme Court was 
again faced with a patent case.  In 2007, CLS Bank sued Alice Corp. 
seeking a declaratory judgment that Alice’s patents, which included 
computer software designed to mitigate settlement risk, were invalid under 
35 U.S.C. § 101, the Code’s provision that defines patentable subject 
matter.121  Alice counterclaimed, alleging that CLS Bank had infringed 
those patents.122  The district court determined that the patents were 
ineligible under § 101.123  The Federal Circuit ultimately affirmed the 
district court’s ruling after granting a rehearing en banc.124  The Supreme 
Court affirmed, holding that Alice’s patents were invalid because they 
“fail[ed] to transform [an] abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”125  
The Court relied on its long-held view that there are several types of subject 
matter that cannot be patented.126  These exclusions include “[l]aws of 
nature, phenomena, and abstract ideas,” none of which are patentable under 
§ 101.127  Granting a patent in any of these areas would, in the Court’s 
view, create a monopoly over basic tools that should be available to 
everyone.128  The Court further explained that, in determining whether a 
patent is excluded, it must “distinguish between patents that claim the 
‘buildin[g] block[s]’ of human ingenuity and those that integrate the 
building blocks into something more, thereby ‘transform[ing]’ them into a 
patent-eligible invention.”129 
The Court then evaluated Alice’s patents using the two-step framework 
established in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc.130  Mayo involved a medical patent, which the Court deemed ineligible 
because it concerned laws of nature; the Court concluded that the patent 
“involve[d] well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously 
engaged in by researchers in the field.”131  First, the Alice Court asked 
whether the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept or, in other 
words, whether the patents fall under one of the § 101 exclusions.132  The 
Court answered this question in the affirmative because Alice’s “claims are 
 
 120. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 121. Id. at 2352–53.  Section 101 defines patentable subject matter as “any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 122. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2353. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 2352. 
 126. Id. at 2354. 
 127. Id. (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107, 2116 (2013)). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303, 1294 (2012)). 
 130. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 131. Id. at 1294. 
 132. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
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drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement.”133  The second step 
consists of “a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or 
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in 
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible 
concept] itself.’”134  This step requires that the claimant transform the 
abstract idea in some more significant way than simply “adding the words 
‘apply it.’”135  The Court declined to identify an “inventive concept” in 
Alice’s patents because the claimed method did no more “than simply 
instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated 
settlement on a generic computer.”136  The Court reasoned that because the 
patent improved neither on the computer itself nor on any other technology, 
it did not sufficiently transform an abstract idea into an eligible invention 
under § 101.137 
Many commentators posited that the Alice holding would impede patent 
trolls.138  By preventing the assertion of weak software patents, the holding 
denies trolls one of their common strategies for forcing settlements.139  The 
Alice decision is also important because it instructs examiners at the 
USPTO as to which software patents it may issue.140  Thus, if weak 
software patents are not issued in the first place, trolls cannot use them to 
allege infringement.  Additionally, a study by Lex Machina, a company that 
compiles litigation data, found that new patent case filings were down 40 
percent between September 2013 and September 2014.141  Mark Lemley, a 
cofounder of Lex Machina, believes that this decrease is directly tied to the 
Supreme Court’s Alice ruling, as those holding weak software patents now 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294). 
 135. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. 
 136. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359. 
 137. Id. at 2359–60. 
 138. See Klint Finley, Supreme Court Deals Major Blow to Patent Trolls, WIRED (June 
19, 2014, 3:48 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/06/supreme-court-deals-major-blow-to-
patent-trolls/ (“The Supreme Court just dealt a major blow to patent trolls.”) 
[http://perma.cc/U2SF-23WV]; Julie Samuels, Patent Trolls Are Mortally Wounded, SLATE 
(June 20, 2014, 1:47 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/06/ 
alice_v_cls_bank_supreme_court_gets_software_patent_ruling_right.html (“So now we’re 
living in a world where fewer bad software patents will be granted, and the patent troll 
arsenal will be a little lighter.”) [http://perma.cc/4UYV-SW9N]. 
 139. See Samuels, supra note 138 (stating that Alice “significantly tighten[ed] the 
standard for what is and what is not patentable,” which “will undoubtedly lead to fewer low-
quality software patents” and lighten “the patent troll arsenal”). 
 140. See Finley, supra note 138 (quoting Julie Samuels, the Executive Director at public 
policy think tank, Engine:  “What the Supreme Court did in [Alice] is give parties dealing 
with those various patents a very important tool to fight back by invalidating those patents 
and, going forward, gives the patent office instruction about what it can and cannot issue 
patents on”). 
 141. Brian Howard, September 2014 New Patent Case Filings Down 40% from 
September 2013, LEX MACHINA (Oct. 8, 2014), https://lexmachina.com/september-2014-
new-patent-case-filings-40-september-2013/ [https://perma.cc/7AHM-UHF5]. 
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face a lower likelihood of successful litigation in the post-Alice 
landscape.142 
c.  Octane and Highmark:  
Shifting to More Lenient Discretion in Awarding Attorneys’ Fees 
In April 2014, the Supreme Court issued twin rulings on attorney-fee 
awards in patent cases.143  These rulings make it easier for defendants to 
force plaintiffs to compensate their defense costs, a step that many in the 
patent field believe may help curb trolls.144 
In Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,145 the Court 
addressed the circumstances under which a court may award a prevailing 
party attorneys’ fees.146  The U.S. Code authorizes district courts to award 
fees to prevailing parties in “exceptional cases.”147  The Federal Circuit had 
previously interpreted this provision in a strict sense, making it nearly 
impossible for defendants to receive attorneys’ fees, even when the case 
against them was weak.148  Under the Federal Circuit’s standard, a case is 
considered “exceptional” only in two limited circumstances:  (1) “when 
there has been some material inappropriate conduct related to the matter in 
litigation”; or (2) when both “the litigation is brought in subjective bad 
faith, and . . . the litigation is objectively baseless.”149  In Octane, however, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Circuit’s standard is “unduly rigid, 
and it impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district 
courts.”150  The Court concluded that the standard for awarding attorneys’ 
fees should be more flexible and that district courts may award fees “in the 
case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the 
circumstances.”151 
 
 142. Id. (“Stanford Law Professor Mark Lemley, a patent litigator at Durie Tangri and a 
founder of Lex Machina, said that he thought more patentees were deciding not to file suit 
after Alice:  ‘In the last two months, we’ve seen over a dozen decisions invalidating software 
and business method patents on the basis of Alice.  That’s a pretty strong deterrent to 
software plaintiffs whose patent isn’t directed to specific new computer technology.’”). 
 143. Both rulings were unanimous. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1752 (2014); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 1744, 1746 (2014). 
 144. See Daniel Nazer, Watch Out Trolls:  Supreme Court Expands Fee Shifting in Patent 
Cases, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/ 
watch-out-trolls-supreme-court-expands-fee-shifting-patent-cases (“This decision is bad 
news for patent trolls who bring weak cases and use the high cost of defense to extort 
settlements.”) [https://perma.cc/2677-6USQ]. 
 145. 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). 
 146. Id. at 1752–53. 
 147. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012). 
 148. See Nazer, supra note 144. 
 149. Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (2005). 
 150. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1755. 
 151. Id. at 1756.  The Court also rejected the Federal Circuit’s requirement that an 
entitlement to fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 be established by the heightened clear and 
convincing evidence standard. Id. at 1758. 
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The Court’s opinion in Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Management 
Systems, Inc.152 also addressed fee awards in patent cases.  In that case, the 
Court considered the issue of “whether an appellate court should accord 
deference to a district court’s determination that litigation is ‘objectively 
baseless.’”153  Citing its ruling in Octane, the Court noted that, consistent 
with prior cases, matters of discretion are “reviewed only for abuse of 
discretion.”154  The Court emphasized that this makes sense 
administratively because district courts are situated more closely to the 
details of the case and “live[] with the case over a prolonged period of 
time.”155 
While many commentators note the importance of the Supreme Court’s 
fee-shifting rulings, organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
note that Octane and Highmark addressed only one of a number of patent 
reform issues and that lawmakers must not lose focus on patent-reform 
legislation just because the Supreme Court issued a patent ruling.156 
II.  PATENT TROLLS:  
WHO THEY ARE AND WHY THEY MATTER 
The many inconsistencies and gray areas in the current patent system 
have driven the exponential increase in a new, litigious breed:  patent trolls.  
Part II.A provides a case study of Intellectual Ventures, a well-known 
patent troll, and outlines many of the common characteristics and litigation 
patterns of patent trolls.  Part II.B explains why lawmakers and inventors 
care about patent trolls.  It also highlights the characteristics of our current 
patent system that have weaknesses—or gray areas—that trolls can exploit.  
Additionally, Part II.B summarizes several recent studies that show the 
negative impact of patent trolls on innovation.  Part II.B concludes with a 
discussion of the anticompetitive nature of trolls and why this is significant 
under the antitrust laws.  Part II.C discusses patent-troll supporters and how 
they view the patent troll’s role in the patent system. 
A.  Patent-Troll Behavior 
An introduction to patent-troll behavior may best be presented through a 
case study of a patent troll.  Intellectual Ventures, often identified as one of 
the predominant patent trolls in Silicon Valley,157 provides an insightful 
peek into typical troll behavior.  Many of the following details regarding 
Intellectual Ventures are drawn from This American Life’s investigatory 
work, broadcast on National Public Radio158 (NPR). 
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Intellectual Ventures was founded in 2000 by Peter Detkin, the man who 
coined the term “patent troll,”159 and Nathan Myhrvold, former Chief 
Technology Officer of Microsoft.160  Intellectual Ventures is well known in 
the patent world—it has one of the largest patent portfolios in the United 
States and often approaches companies to demand money for licenses of 
patents it owns.161  This American Life estimates that Intellectual Ventures 
has purchased more than 30,000 patents.162 
Like Intellectual Ventures, most patent trolls do not “practice” their 
patents—that is, they do not develop or manufacture any goods or services 
related to the patents they own.163  Rather, they acquire patents solely to 
pressure companies to pay licensing fees.164  It is this trait that distinguishes 
a patent troll from a non-practicing entity (NPE).  The term NPE includes 
any entity that owns patents, but does not manufacture or sell products with 
those patents.165  Patent trolls share their nonpracticing status with NPEs, 
but NPEs also include legitimate nonpracticing parties, such as 
universities.166  Trolls, on the other hand, use this status to immunize 
themselves from counterclaims of patent infringement.167 
Patent trolls often acquire patents in bankruptcy proceedings.168  For 
example, because so many companies failed after the dot-com boom, patent 
trolls were able to purchase intellectual property assets at discounted 
prices.169 
The patent at issue in the This American Life episode on patents was 
owned by Chris Crawford.170  That patent was granted for an invention that 
allowed personal computer owners to upgrade their computer software 
through the internet—these software updates have become commonplace in 
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modern computer use.171  However, NPR revealed that more than 5000 
other patents cover the same material as Crawford’s patent.172  This is one 
of trolls’ common litigation tactics—they acquire vague patents and make 
broad assertions of infringement, betting that target companies will pay 
licensing fees rather than risk costly litigation.173 
After Intellectual Ventures bought the patent from Crawford, the 
ownership history indicates that two other companies owned the patent 
following Intellectual Ventures in succession.174  Those two companies, 
Kwon Holdings and Enhanced Software LLC, both had the same office 
address as Intellectual Ventures.175  The patent ended up in the hands of 
another company, called Oasis Research, in June 2010.176  Within a month, 
Oasis Research had used the patent to sue over a dozen companies.177 
This part of This American Life’s investigation highlights two important 
troll tactics:  demand letters and shell companies.  When a patent troll gets 
its hands on a patent, it usually sends letters to dozens, or even hundreds, of 
companies demanding licensing fees.178  One study estimates that in 2012, 
trolls sent a minimum of 60,000 demand letters, with this number more 
likely exceeding 100,000.179 
Additionally, the use of shell companies180 has become a growing 
problem in patent litigation.181  One article estimates that Intellectual 
Ventures has more than 2000 shell companies.182  Patent trolls create shell 
companies to mask their true identity, often creating difficulty for defendant 
companies who wish to learn more about the patents being asserted and the 
companies asserting them.183 
Hoping to learn more about Crawford’s patent, This American Life’s 
reporters repeatedly telephoned Oasis Research, but they only reached the 
company’s voicemail.184  Additionally, public information about Oasis was 
limited, and the reporters could not identify who owned the company or its 
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number of employees, if any.185  They were, however, able to track down 
an office address in Marshall, Texas.186  When the reporters visited the 
office building, the door was locked, no employees were present, and the 
lights were turned off.187  A local lawyer told NPR that he had never seen 
anyone come in or out of this office.188 
In the Oasis Research case, sixteen of the eighteen companies that Oasis 
sued settled.189  The other two companies, EMC and Carbonite, went to 
trial.190  Carbonite won at trial.191  Because they did not sign a 
nondisclosure agreement in a settlement, Carbonite was willing to share 
with the reporters that Oasis’s original settlement offer was $20 million.192  
This American Life also reported that Intellectual Ventures has generated $2 
billion in revenue since 2000.193 
This story is not uncommon.  Many trolls use similar tactics to those used 
by Intellectual Ventures:  they create shell companies to mask their true 
identity; they assert weak patents; and they send letters to companies 
alleging patent infringement, demanding licensing fees, or threatening 
litigation. 
B.  Why Do We Care About Patent Trolls? 
Patent-troll behavior concerns many because patent trolls are able to 
game the system and assert weak patents against defendants who lack the 
financial capacity to litigate.194  For one, many worry that patent trolls have 
exploited several weaknesses in the patent system.195  Additionally, studies 
indicate that troll behavior has a negative impact on innovation,196 a result 
at odds with the main functions of the patent system:  to protect inventors 
and spur innovation.197 
1.  Trolls Are Changing the Landscape of Patent Litigation 
Because patent trolls do not produce goods with the patents they hold, 
they have an advantage over those who do manufacture goods as they are 
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not subject to countersuits.198  During litigation between two goods-
producing companies, the parties often settle their claims by cross-
licensing.199  However, because trolls do not manufacture anything, they 
run no risk of infringing others’ patents, which often leads to uneven 
negotiating power in litigation.200 
In addition to uneven negotiating power, litigation involving patent trolls 
is frequently marred by asymmetrical financial burdens.  Often working 
with lawyers under a contingency agreement, trolls can send hundreds of 
demand letters asserting infringement at relatively low cost and then simply 
pay the lawyer’s fees on whichever assertions are successful.201  They often 
use timing tactics by waiting to assert infringement claims until after a 
potential defendant’s product has been widely commercialized.202  This 
allows patent trolls to threaten litigation at a time when the defendant’s cost 
of changing its product is too high, so the defendant is pressured into 
settling the claim.203  Additionally, a troll often asserts multiple claims 
against a defendant to increase the cost of discovery and preparation, but 
will drop its weaker claims when it gets closer to trial.204  
Patent trolls need not worry themselves with reputational harms, 
disruption to a product line, and other indirect costs.205  Because trolls do 
not make products but rather have a business based purely on asserting 
infringement claims, their public image is not a concern.206  Well-known 
companies that make consumer products, on the other hand, have an interest 
in avoiding a reputation of victimizing others.207  Additionally, trolls do not 
face the risk that an injunction could halt sales of an entire line of products, 
which may be essential for a company to continue to remain competitive in 
the marketplace.208  Companies may face other indirect costs in defending 
against a troll, including lost productivity from employees diverting their 
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time and attention to a lawsuit.209  An analysis of these litigation tactics led 
the FTC to assert, “[W]e can see how PAEs have really changed this 
dynamic[] and made it economical both to bring suit, as well as to settle a 
suit.”210 
2.  Trolls Can Take Advantage 
of Weaknesses in the Patent System 
There are numerous areas in current patent law that trolls exploit to their 
advantage, including several stemming from congestion at the USPTO.211  
Additionally, trolls enjoy many procedural benefits under current law.212  
These weak areas of patent law are strong tools for patent trolls, and they 
highlight the need for increased reform. 
a.  High Volume at the USPTO 
In the last few years, the USPTO has received an unprecedented number 
of patent applications.  Between 2010 and 2012, the office received an 
average of 540,000 applications per year.213  Between 2000 and 2002, the 
USPTO’s average number of applications per year was 340,000; between 
1990 and 1992, it was only 180,000.214  Because it is receiving so many 
more applications, the USPTO is issuing more patents now than in previous 
years.215  However, more patents does not mean more good patents; more 
likely, the increased number of patent grants has led to the existence of far 
more overly broad or weak patents.216  Gary Reback, a Silicon Valley 
antitrust and intellectual property lawyer, suggests that there may be 
financial motives behind this increase.217  Because the USPTO receives 
fees when it grants a patent, in recent years it has relished its role as “a 
government profit center.”218  In fact, Reback notes, “[T]he USPTO started 
openly advocating that its performance be measured by the amount that it 
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contributed to the public coffers.”219  He also points out that economists 
have shown that patents may hinder the introduction of new products in 
certain situations.220 
The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that the USPTO has a 
backlog of more than 750,000 patent applications.221  This number is twice 
as great as it was one decade ago.222  Additionally, the average wait time 
between the filing of a patent application and its final disposition is thirty-
four months.223  The Department of Commerce notes that delays are 
“particularly problematic for startups with high growth potential.”224  The 
significant delays due to backlog at the USPTO can hinder these companies 
from obtaining financing in the crucial early stages of investment.225  
Additionally, one study conducted by the U.K. Intellectual Property Office, 
focusing on all major patent systems across the world, found that these 
types of patent delays often result in “foregone innovation,” which can cost 
the economy billions of dollars a year.226 
b.  Low-Quality Patents 
Many point to low-quality patents as the primary defect of the current 
patent system.  These include overly broad patents, many of which are 
software patents, as well as patents being issued for the same invention. 
It is easy to see why an inventor would prefer a broad patent—the wider 
the net of protected subject matter is cast, the more rights the patent owner 
can claim.227  However, the grant of overly broad patents is problematic 
because these patents often fail to meet the statutory requirement of 
nonobviousness.228 
Many note that a majority of software patents are vague or overly broad, 
making it difficult for others to discern what they cover.229  Patent trolls 
make a business out of capitalizing on this uncertainty.  According to one 
study, 82 percent of defendants sued by patent trolls were sued on the basis 
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of a software patent, compared to 30 percent of defendants sued by non-
trolls.230  Software-patent litigation is also problematic because it can deter 
innovation and present economic issues.231  Julie Brill, a commissioner of 
the FTC, reported that the FTC “found that trivial and overbroad patents—
including software and business method patents—can undermine 
competition, with no offsetting benefits to consumers, by leading a 
competitor to forgo research and development in an area the patent 
supposedly covers, deterring follow-on innovation and new market 
entry.”232 
Because of rapid technological growth, a single product today can 
incorporate the use of thousands of patents.233  Therefore, in ensuring 
efficient licensing, the scope of these patents must be clearly defined.  
According to the FTC, an overly broad or unclear patent harms competition 
because “it is much more difficult to license and cross-license patents in a 
manner that promotes innovation and competition.”234  Patent trolls have 
exploited this growth in technology and the unclear boundaries of software 
patents.235 
Patent trolls also have exploited other areas of legal uncertainty 
surrounding software patents.  First, because of the vague boundaries of 
these patents, it becomes difficult for defendants to predict whether the 
patent will be invalidated in court.236  Additionally, because litigation is 
expensive, defendants usually find it more economical to pay the licensing 
fees for these weak patents than to challenge them in court.237  According to 
the Department of Commerce, “[L]itigation and . . . licensing costs 
represent a significant tax on innovation.”238 
Another problem arises when patents are issued for technologies that 
have already been patented.  NPR interviewed David Martin, who runs the 
company M-CAM—which governments, businesses, and other entities 
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hired to evaluate patent quality—for the This American Life story.  Martin 
has testified before Congress that 30 percent of U.S. patents are issued for 
products that already have been invented.239  This poses a problem in the 
enforcement of patents because there may be more than one patent holder 
asserting rights in the same technology. 
c.  Filing Concentration in Certain Districts 
Another layer contributing to the complexity of the modern patent system 
is the concentration of patent cases in just a few federal district courts.  Lex 
Machina reported a 12.4 percent increase in new patent cases filed from 
2012 (5418 new cases) to 2013 (6092 new cases).240  The report also found 
that these cases tend to be extremely concentrated in two respects:  in the 
district courts that hear them and in the judges within those districts who 
preside over them.241  In 2013, 1495 cases were filed in the Eastern District 
of Texas, and 1336 cases were filed in the District of Delaware.242  Nearly 
25 percent of patent suits in 2013 were filed in the Eastern District of 
Texas.243  Additionally, within the Eastern District of Texas in 2013, one 
judge, Judge Gilstrap, heard 941 cases—63 percent of that district’s patent 
cases that year.244 
Commentators offer several explanations for the high filing concentration 
in the Eastern District of Texas.  Some note that juries in this part of Texas 
are notoriously plaintiff friendly, especially to patent owners trying to win a 
large verdict.245  Others explain that patent litigators were originally just 
looking for a district without many criminal prosecutions, as those cases 
take precedent in the federal court system over civil cases.246  In a similar 
vein, some point out that the Eastern District’s quick litigation timetable 
enables trolls to pressure defendants to settle.247 
Another possible factor is the district’s local practices that may favor 
patent trolls.  Specifically, parties must seek the court’s permission before 
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submitting a motion for summary judgment.248  The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, for one, criticizes this practice for not only its inconsistency 
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,249 but also for the district’s 
“refusal . . . to end meritless cases before trial.”250  Thus, defendants in the 
Eastern District of Texas face an additional hurdle in having a motion for 
summary judgment decided.251  Additionally, a defendant whose summary 
judgment motion is not heard could face exorbitant trial costs, which may 
encourage a settlement even though the troll’s patent is invalid.252 
The Lex Machina study also reported that the ten plaintiffs who filed the 
most new cases in the United States in 2013 were all patent trolls.253  The 
top three plaintiffs filed 137, 131, and 117 new cases, respectively.254  
Many of these companies buy office space in Texas to establish jurisdiction 
in the district.255  While the joinder provisions of the AIA were intended to 
prevent forum shopping,256 Lex Machina’s data suggests that trolls are still 
fully capable of choosing preferential venues even in the post-AIA 
landscape. 
3.  Patent Trolls Can Harm Innovation 
While promoting innovation is a primary goal of patent protection, 
patent-troll behavior has a negative effect on innovation.  According to the 
White House, “Even if patent assertion entities do not prevail in the 
courtroom, their actions can significantly reduce incremental innovation 
while litigation is ongoing, a situation that can persist for years.”257  
Companies sued by patent trolls must allocate resources to defensive 
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 253. See BYRD & HOWARD, supra note 240, at 8.  The study opted to use the term “patent 
monetization entities” instead of PAEs or patent trolls, but the defined category covers the 
same entities. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See supra Part II.A (discussing NPR’s visit to an unoccupied office of a suspected 
troll shell company). 
 256. See supra Part I.C.1.a. 
 257. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 7, at 10.  The report also notes that 
PAEs “pursu[e] legal action in a way that does not increase incentives for innovation, and in 
fact reduces these incentives and complicates normal business operation.” Id. at 6. 
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strategies—funds that otherwise would have been spent on developing 
technology.258  Litigation costs thus hinder research and development259 
(R&D).  Without litigation spending, companies could invest more in R&D 
to create new patentable inventions, resulting in what the U.S. Department 
of Commerce calls “a virtuous cycle of innovation, growth, and additional 
innovation.”260 
Several studies published in the last two years aim to quantify the impact 
of patent trolls on R&D at different types of companies.  All find a tangible 
impact. 
a.  Recent Studies Provide Concrete Evidence 
of a Negative Impact on Innovation 
Several recent studies indicate the damage that patent trolls have on 
innovation.  One study, conducted by Harvard University and the 
University of Texas, aimed to discover how trolls affect innovation at 
publicly traded companies.261  As an initial matter, the researchers 
concluded that “NPEs on average behave as patent trolls,”262 so the study 
generally uses the terms synonymously.  The study found that “as NPEs 
become effective at bringing opportunistic lawsuits, they can inefficiently 
crowd out some firms that would otherwise produce welfare-enhancing 
innovations without engaging in infringement.”263  The study also 
determined that certain types of firms, including “[f]irms with large cash 
balances and firms with positive shocks to their cash holdings,” are more 
likely to be targeted by NPEs.264  The study found that “losing to an NPE 
has a large and negative impact on future R&D activities,” with the study’s 
results showing that “firms that lose to a large aggregator NPE . . . invest 
significantly less in R&D in the years following the loss . . . relative to 
firms that were also targeted by NPEs but won.”265  Additionally, patent 
trolls are more likely to sue companies that have a small legal department or 
are tied up in other litigation, which may encourage companies to spend 
 
 258. See id. at 9 (reporting that defense costs in patent-troll litigation can range from 
“$650,000 for smaller cases, to a median of over $5 million per case where the amount in 
controversy exceeds $25 million,” which has “added significant costs to the innovation 
ecosystem and sapped investments in research and development, causing great harm to 
society”). 
 259. See Vaikhari, supra note 236, at 36 (“The legal costs associated with litigation 
initiated by patent trolls also reduce the funding available for innovation, and these legal 
costs can rise to quite significant amounts.  Personnel who would otherwise be engaged in 
promoting innovation throughout the organization will have their attention diverted 
elsewhere by the litigation, which will consume the human resources of the technology 
developers in addition to the financial resources.”). 
 260. RAI ET AL., supra note 221, at 2. 
 261. Lauren Cohen et al., Patent Trolls:  Evidence from Targeted Firms (Harvard Bus. 
Sch., Working Paper No. 15-002, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2464303 [http://perma.cc/WM28-UDRJ]. 
 262. See Cohen et al., supra note 261, at 5. 
 263. Id. at 34. 
 264. Id. at 18. 
 265. Id. at 31. 
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money on hiring lawyers that could instead be spent on developing new 
technology.266  Companies may thus invest less in new technologies.267  
They may also make settlement payments to patent trolls to avoid the time 
and expense of litigation.268 
Additionally, Catherine Tucker, a researcher at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, studied the effects of patent-troll litigation on 
medical-imaging businesses.269  Tucker was able to compare the innovative 
behavior of firms that made otherwise similar products; the only difference 
among firms was whether they had been the target of patent litigation.270  
Tucker focused on the patent litigation instituted by a company called 
Acacia, “the seventh-largest patent-assertion entity in terms of its patent 
holdings,” which is known for the aggressive litigation of its patent 
portfolio.271  Acacia’s litigation centered on its 2005 purchase of two 
patents for medical-imaging systems.272  Tucker found evidence of “a large 
reduction in sales of imaging software products affected by the patent 
litigation relative to other similar products that were produced by the same 
firms.”273  Firms that were not the target of patent litigation experienced 
“no such significant change in sales” of their similar imaging software 
product.274  Tucker explained that the reason for the disparate sales figures 
stems from the fact that firms facing litigation did not release new models 
 
 266. Id. at 4. 
 267. See Timothy B. Lee, New Study Shows Exactly How Patent Trolls Destroy 
Innovation, VOX (Aug. 19, 2014, 7:20 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/8/19/6036975/new-
study-shows-exactly-how-patent-trolls-innovation (“That’s a problem because it creates a 
disincentive for larger companies to make risky investments in cutting-edge technologies.  
Trolls may target a company for patent infringement long before a product begins turning a 
profit.  Since there’s no guarantee that new technology products ever will turn a profit, firms 
may be deterred from investing in high-tech products in the first place.”) 
[http://perma.cc/884Q-V5AA]. 
 268. One recent example of this is Adam Carolla’s settlement with Personal Audio, a 
company that sued Carolla to claim royalties on his podcast. See Jason Abbruzzese, Adam 
Carolla Settles Podcast Suit with ‘Patent Troll,’ but the War Continues, MASHABLE (Aug. 
18, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/08/18/adam-carolla-patent-case-settle [http://perma.cc/ 
YB67-BF5J].  The Electronic Frontier Foundation, however, expressed disappointment with 
Carolla’s decision to settle.  The nonprofit wrote, “By settling now, Carolla gives up the 
chance to make Personal Audio pay his fees.  If a defendant wins on the merits, it can get 
fees in extraordinary cases.  Winning fees would be a huge deterrent to future litigation from 
Personal Audio.” Daniel Nazer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Adam Carolla’s 
Settlement with the Podcasting Troll, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 18, 2014), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/08/good-bad-and-ugly-adam-carollas-settlement-
podcasting-troll [https://perma.cc/DFD3-MS9C]. 
 269. Catherine Tucker, Patent Trolls and Technology Diffusion:  The Case of Medical 
Imaging (Mass. Inst. of Tech., Working Paper, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1976593 [http://perma.cc/V88L-2V5J]. 
 270. Id. at 3.  Tucker summarized the focus of her study as “the effect of patent litigation 
on the sales of affected products relative to similar products made by the exact same firms.” 
Id. 
 271. Id. at 5–6. 
 272. Id. at 6.  The lawsuit was filed in the Eastern District of Texas against a number of 
companies including GE Healthcare, Fujifilm Medical Systems, and Philips Electronics. Id. 
at 7. 
 273. Id. at 3. 
 274. Id. 
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or update their existing products during the period of litigation.275  Thus, 
the firms facing litigation did not engage in product innovation while 
defending themselves against patent-infringement claims.276  Tucker 
stressed that the whole period of litigation significantly hinders innovation, 
often for lengthy amounts of time, and she explained that the products of 
target firms may become increasingly less desirable due to the slowed or 
halted product innovation.277 
A 2013 study confirmed that patent-troll litigation has a deleterious effect 
on small businesses.278  The researchers found that small firms not only 
have higher rates of litigation as alleged infringers, but that litigation also 
puts a greater strain on small firms than on large firms.279  This can, 
therefore, lead to more settlements, as smaller firms have a financial 
incentive to avoid litigation.280 
b.  Patent Trolls Are Not Innovators 
Innovation plays a major role in the economy of the United States—it 
creates new jobs281 and stimulates economic growth.282  One report 
estimates that innovation accounts for 75 percent of post-World War II 
growth in the United States.283  However, because trolls do not create 
products or use the patents they own in any manner other than extracting 
license fees and initiating litigation, their business model does not spawn 
further innovation, one of the primary purposes of patent law.284  
Additionally, they generally acquire existing patents rather than inventing 
new technologies themselves.285  It is well established in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that a valid patent requires “an innovation for which society 
is truly indebted to the efforts of the patentee.”286  Thus, while patent trolls 
utilize many advantages and protections that the patent system offers, they 
contribute no such benefit to society due to their lack of innovation. 
 
 275. Id. at 4. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion, 45 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 401, 425 (2013). 
 279. Id. 
 280. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 281. Additionally, studies show that innovation produces not just jobs, but produces high-
paying jobs. See RAI ET AL., supra note 221, at 3. 
 282. Id. at 2.  Innovation also “helps decrease the price of many existing 
products, . . . improves their quality[,] . . . creates opportunities for investment in altogether 
new types of capital equipment, such as robotics[,] [and] . . . promotes efficiency by 
generating better ways of working, manufacturing, [and] selling.” Id. at 3. 
 283. See id. at 2. 
 284. See infra Part I.B (discussing patent law’s policy goals). 
 285. See COALITION FOR PATENT FAIRNESS, supra note 70, at 2. 
 286. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1945) (further 
noting that “[t]he primary purpose of our patent system is not reward of the individual but 
the advancement of the arts and sciences” and that the “disclosure of [these] advances in 
knowledge . . . be beneficial to society”). 
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4.  Patent Trolls Exhibit Anticompetitive Behavior 
Trolls may deter competition in various ways.  In a 2011 report, the FTC 
found that trolls’ assertions of patents impose costs that threaten to “distort 
competition in technology markets, raise prices and decrease incentives to 
innovate.”287  Thus, to address this anticompetitive behavior, lawmakers 
must balance the policy goals of two bodies of law:  patent law, which aims 
to foster innovation by granting the inventor a temporary monopoly, and 
antitrust law, which aims to promote competition in the marketplace and 
protect consumers.288  In the last few years, the FTC has expressed interest 
in the patent-troll problem.  While some have called for the antitrust 
authorities to play an increased role in policing trolls, it is unclear what 
their role will be going forward. 
a.  What Is Antitrust Law’s Role in the Patent System? 
Antitrust law seeks to ensure competition in the marketplace and protect 
consumers.289  Lawmakers further these goals by regulating business 
practices and penalizing anticompetitive behavior.290  The main statutes that 
govern antitrust law are the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal 
Trade Commission Act.291  The Sherman Act, passed in 1890, provides the 
foundation for antitrust law—it prohibits certain business practices that 
Congress deemed anticompetitive.292  The Clayton Act, passed in 1914, 
builds upon the Sherman Act by forbidding several specific practices not 
mentioned in the Sherman Act.293  For example, the Clayton Act governs 
mergers and acquisitions, a topic not explicitly covered by the Sherman 
Act.294  The Federal Trade Commission Act bans “unfair methods of 
competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”295  It also 
established the FTC, which consists of five commissioners appointed by the 
 
 287. FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE:  ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES 
WITH COMPETITION 71 (2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/G4F2-PV7W]. 
 288. See Reback, supra note 216 (“The tension between the patent as a way to stimulate 
invention and the patent as a weapon against legitimate competition is inherent in the 
system.”). 
 289. See The Antitrust Laws, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) (“[F]or over 100 
years, the antitrust laws have had the same basic objective:  to protect the process of 
competition for the benefit of consumers, making sure there are strong incentives for 
businesses to operate efficiently, keep prices down, and keep quality up.”) [http://perma.cc/ 
PV7B-VJAC]. 
 290. See id. 
 291. See id. (“With some revisions, these are the three core federal antitrust laws still in 
effect today.”). 
 292. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
 293. See id. §§ 12–27. 
 294. See id. § 18. 
 295. Id. § 45(a)(1). 
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President.296  Together, these statutes promote antitrust law’s policy goals 
of furthering marketplace competition and consumer protection.297 
Balancing the policy goals of patent law and competition law is not a 
new concept.  Over two centuries ago, Thomas Jefferson voiced concerns 
about patent law’s temporary monopolies.  The Supreme Court has 
summarized Jefferson’s qualms:  “[T]he underlying policy of the patent 
system that ‘the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of 
an exclusive patent,’ as Jefferson put it, must outweigh the restrictive effect 
of the limited patent monopoly.”298  The Federal Circuit also has described 
these two bodies of law as having a reciprocal relationship:  “Intellectual 
property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws.  ‘But it 
is also correct that the antitrust laws do not negate the patentee’s right to 
exclude others from patent property.’”299  Thus, to address the patent-troll 
problem, lawmakers must establish guidelines that prevent trolls from 
abusing the system without punishing innovators or harming competition. 
The Federal Circuit has long recognized that “the aims and objectives of 
patent and antitrust laws . . . are actually complementary, as both are aimed 
at encouraging innovation, industry and competition.”300  Through the 
existence of a competitive market, companies are constantly motivated to 
innovate.301  In a workshop sponsored by the USPTO, FTC, and 
Department of Justice (DOJ), Christine Varney—the Assistant Attorney 
General for the Antitrust Division of the DOJ at the time—discussed these 
overlapping policies, explaining that “[b]oth disciplines promote dynamic 
 
 296. See id. § 41. 
 297. See The Antitrust Laws, supra note 289. 
 298. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1966).  The Court further elaborated 
on Jefferson’s precocious views of the patent system: 
The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in 
his discoveries.  Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new 
knowledge.  The grant of an exclusive right to an invention was the creation of 
society—at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas—and was not to 
be freely given.  Only inventions and discoveries which furthered human 
knowledge, and were new and useful, justified the special inducement of a limited 
private monopoly.  Jefferson did not believe in granting patents for small details, 
obvious improvements, or frivolous devices.  His writings evidence his insistence 
upon a high level of patentability. 
Id. at 9. 
 299. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see also 
Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that “[t]he 
commercial advantage gained by new technology and its statutory protection by patent do 
not convert the possessor thereof into a prohibited monopolist”). 
 300. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876–77 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 301. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen. for the Antitrust Div. of the Dep’t 
of Justice, Remarks As Prepared for the Joint Workshop of the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of Justice, Promoting Innovation 
Through Patent and Antitrust Law and Policy 2 (May 26, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/public/speeches/260101.pdf (noting that “this [competitive] environment is what pushes 
companies to constantly innovate and allows them to profit when they do”) 
[http://perma.cc/K6ZU-735T]. 
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efficiency.”302  She continued by observing that patent law’s “system of 
property rights” and antitrust law’s “market rules” work together to “create 
appropriate incentives for invention, innovation, and risk taking—
delivering the greatest returns for society not just for today, but tomorrow 
as well.”303  Antitrust law, she explained, respects the role that patents play 
in furthering innovation, but also provides certain rules about how patent 
monopolies operate in the marketplace.304 
A violation of the antitrust laws may occur in certain instances in a patent 
case.  For example, antitrust allegations may arise where a patent is 
fraudulently obtained and is then asserted in an anticompetitive manner.305  
Additionally, a patent holder may violate section 2 of the Sherman Act306 if 
he initiates a series of infringement actions in bad faith and has 
exclusionary power in the relevant market.307  In a 2013 opinion, the 
Supreme Court made clear that the FTC can sue patent abusers on antitrust 
grounds, noting, “[T]his Court’s precedents make clear that patent-related 
settlement agreements can sometimes violate the antitrust laws.”308  In 
recent years, however, the antitrust rules only have been used to a limited 
extent in combating trolls.309 
Antitrust and patent authorities alike have an interest in the outcome of 
patent cases.  For example, the government submitted an amicus curiae 
brief in eBay.310  The brief explained, “[B]ecause the grant or denial of 
patent injunctions may directly affect competition and innovation in the 
marketplace, this case implicates questions of core concern to both the 
Federal Trade Commission . . . and the Antitrust Division of the United 
States Department of Justice.”311  Additionally, as Congress has vested the 
power of patent examination in the USPTO, an agency of the Department of 
Commerce, the government has a continuing interest in patent litigation.312  
When injunctive relief is cast too widely, this may impair competition when 
 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id.  Varney further noted, “[A]ntitrust and patent law work together to create and 
preserve the appropriate incentives for technological progress by creating property rights and 
preserving competition around those rights.” Id. at 3. 
 304. Id. at 2–3. 
 305. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 
(1965) (“We have concluded that the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the 
Patent Office may be violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act provided the other elements 
necessary to a § 2 case are present.”). 
 306. Section 2 covers individuals who seek to monopolize the market. 15 U.S.C. § 2 
(2012). 
 307. Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 993, 993 n.13 (9th Cir. 1979) (also 
observing that “infringement actions initiated and conducted in bad faith contribute nothing 
to the furtherance of the policies of either the patent law or the antitrust law”). 
 308. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2225 (2013). 
 309. See infra Part II.B.4.b (discussing several states that have attacked patent trolls 
through consumer protection laws). 
 310. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); see supra Part I.C.2.a. 
 311. See Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, eBay, 
547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f215700/215790.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/K6C4-Z6PH]. 
 312. See id. at 1–2. 
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an innovative product is halted in the marketplace.313  Additionally, when a 
troll uses the threat of an injunction or litigation to extract licensing fees, 
some inventors may become discouraged from innovating at all, which can 
slow the progress of technology as a whole.314  Varney pointed out that 
trolls pose “a real competition problem of the kind that the Antitrust 
Division faces every day.”315  Thus, it is not surprising that the antitrust 
authorities have begun to pay much closer attention to the patent-troll 
problem, as troll behavior raises important competition concerns. 
b.  How Have Lawmakers Used Antitrust Policy to Combat Trolls? 
In the last few years, the FTC has shown great interest in the patent-troll 
problem.  In 2012, the FTC and DOJ held a joint workshop focusing on 
patent trolls and their impact on innovation and competition.316  The FTC 
and DOJ received public comments in conjunction with the workshop.317  
In 2013, the FTC launched an investigation into the behavior of twenty-five 
identified patent trolls, also seeking public comments on the issue.318  
Intellectual Ventures319 and MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC 
(“MPHJ”) are two of the companies included in the investigation. 320  The 
purpose of the investigation is to examine the ways patent trolls “impact 
innovation and competition.”321  In addition to the investigation, the FTC 
also proposed a study to supplement the existing literature and data on 
patent trolls.322  One important aspect of this study is the FTC’s “unique 
[c]ongressional authority to collect nonpublic information, such as licensing 
agreements, patent acquisition information, and cost and revenue data,” 
giving the FTC access to important information that is unavailable to other 
researchers.323  In November 2013, the FTC extended the public comment 
period through the end of 2013.324 
 
 313. See Varney, supra note 301, at 13. 
 314. See id. at 14–15. 
 315. Id. 
 316. See generally FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 7. 
 317. See Press Release, FTC, FTC Seeks to Examine Patent Assertion Entities and Their 
Impact on Innovation, Competition (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2013/09/ftc-seeks-examine-patent-assertion-entities-their-impact [hereinafter Press 
Release] [http://perma.cc/6S7W-F5YW]. 
 318. See id. 
 319. See supra Part II.A. 
 320. MPHJ responded to the investigation by suing the FTC, along with its five 
commissioners, arguing that the FTC’s investigation violated MPHJ’s First Amendment 
rights. See Mike Masnick, Patent Troll Sues the FTC, Saying It Has a First Amendment 
Right to Shake Down Companies Using a Scanner, TECHDIRT (Jan. 14, 2014, 4:12 PM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140114/13300325875/patent-troll-sues-ftc-threatening-
its-business-model.shtml [https://perma.cc/MG5Z-NJ43].  The federal district court for the 
Western District of Texas dismissed MPHJ’s suit, holding that the FTC may continue its 
investigation. See MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC v. FTC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146288, at *14 
(W.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2014). 
 321. See Press Release, supra note 317. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id.  Under section 6(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC can issue 
subpoenas to “person[s], partnership[s], and corporation[s], engaged in or whose business 
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On November 6, 2014, the FTC settled its first consumer-protection 
lawsuit against a troll for using deceptive trade practices.325  The company 
was MPHJ—a troll that, according to the FTC, sent demand letters to more 
than 16,000 companies accusing them of violating a patent for the use of 
document scanners connected to a computer network.326  In the letters, 
MPHJ offered to sell these companies a license for the patent and 
threatened litigation if the companies refused.327  The offering price for the 
license ranged from $1000 to $1200 per employee.328  Additionally, the 
letters falsely represented how many other businesses had already paid 
licensing fees to MPHJ.329  According to the FTC, MPHJ never intended to 
initiate legal action nor was it prepared to do so.330  In a press release, 
MPHJ claimed that it intended to bring the lawsuits, but that its patents 
were being challenged at the time, delaying its ability to initiate 
litigation.331  However, MPHJ agreed to the FTC’s settlement offer; MPHJ 
says it settled simply to avoid further hearings and appeals.332  The 
settlement requires MPHJ, its founder, and its law firm to refrain from 
making false representations when asserting its patent rights.333 
 
affects commerce” to gain access to important information that would not otherwise be 
available, including details about “the organization, business, conduct, practices, 
management, and relation to other corporations, partnerships, and individuals.” 15 U.S.C. 
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 325. See Edward Wyatt, F.T.C. Settles First Case Targeting “Patent Troll”, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/07/business/ftc-settles-first-case-targeting-
patent-troll.html?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/N3ER-VGT6]; Susan Decker, Notorious “Patent 
Troll” MPHJ Will Ease Tactics:  FTC, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 6, 2014, 5:30 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-11-06/notorious-patent-troll-mphj-will-ease-tactics-
ftc.html [http://perma.cc/TE7M-B6JU]. 
 326. See Wyatt, supra note 325.  MPHJ targeted small and midsize companies with fewer 
than 100 employees. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. See Daniel Nazer, Notorious Scanner Troll Settles with FTC, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/11/notorious-scanner-troll-
settles-ftc [https://perma.cc/T2CZ-GVV6].  Additionally, according to the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, MPHJ set up over 100 shell companies to make its deceptive practices 
harder to track. Id. 
 330. See Wyatt, supra note 325. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id.  Under the terms of the settlement, MPHJ must not make any representations 
about its licensing deals with other parties “unless the representation is non-misleading” and 
is substantiated by “competent and reliable evidence.” Agreement Containing Consent Order 
at 4, In re MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC et al., FTC File No. 142-3003 (Nov. 6, 2014), 
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5F79-NZZQ].  Additionally, MPHJ may not make any representations regarding the 
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Many commentators have criticized this settlement as a mere “slap on the 
wrist.”334  Jon Potter, the president of the Consumer Electronics 
Association,335 stated, “This settlement doesn’t even qualify as a slap on the 
wrist to a company that sent demand letters to thousands of businesses—
extorting money, threatening jobs, and stifling innovation.”336  Pointing to 
the absence of both a financial punishment and an admission of guilt, some 
commentators have expressed doubt that this settlement will deter other 
trolls from engaging in the same deceptive tactics.337  The Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, on the other hand, hopes that this case will establish 
the FTC’s continued role in addressing patent-troll activity.338 
Before the FTC stepped in to address MPHJ’s business tactics, 
lawmakers in Vermont, Nebraska, and New York took action against MPHJ 
for its dealings within those states.  In 2013, the Vermont Attorney General 
sued MPHJ for violating the state’s Consumer Protection Act.339  This was 
the first time a patent troll had ever been sued by a state government.340  
The complaint alleged that MPHJ had violated the Consumer Protection 
Act through its use of “unfair” and “deceptive” trade practices.341  The 
alleged unfair trade practices included:  “[s]tating that litigation would be 
brought against the recipients, when Defendant was neither prepared nor 
likely to bring litigation”; “[t]argeting small businesses that were unlikely 
to have the resources to fight patent-litigation, or even to pay patent 
counsel”; “[s]ending letters that threatened patent-infringement litigation 
with no independent evidence that the recipients were infringing its patent”; 
and “[u]sing shell corporations in order to hide the true owners of the 
patents, avoid liability, and encourage quick settlements.”342  The complaint 
also alleged that MPHJ engaged in deceptive trade practices “by making 
deceptive statements in the threatening letters,” which would lead 
consumers to believe that MPHJ “would sue the target businesses if they 
did not respond within two weeks,” that MPHJ “would sue the target 
businesses if they did not pay money,” and that MPHJ’s “licensing program 
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had received a positive response from the business community.”343  In 
response, MPHJ tried to remove the case to federal court; both the district 
court and the Federal Circuit ruled that the case was properly in state court, 
where MPHJ is currently defending the matter.344 
A few weeks after the Vermont suit was filed, the state’s governor signed 
into law the Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement Act.345  In 
response, MPHJ filed a separate federal court action against the state’s 
attorney general challenging the constitutionality of this act as well as the 
application of Vermont’s Consumer Protection Act in the state court action 
against MPHJ.346  The court denied the Attorney General’s motion to 
dismiss MPHJ’s challenges to the Bad Faith Demand Act, reasoning that as 
“there has been no civil enforcement action under the [Bad Faith Assertions 
of Patent Infringement Act], abstention with respect to that statute is 
unwarranted.”347  The court observed that even though MPHJ had not been 
accused of violating this act, “the lack of a specific threat to enforce the 
[law] does not deny MPHJ standing.”348  The district court, however, 
granted the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss as it related to MPHJ’s 
challenges of the application of the Consumer Protection Act, noting, “The 
constitutionality of the statute being enforced can be determined by the state 
courts.”349 
Nebraska was the second state to go after MPHJ.  Nebraska’s Attorney 
General sent MPHJ’s law firm a cease-and-desist letter ordering that no 
infringement demands be made until the Attorney General completed an 
investigation into MPHJ’s alleged use of unfair or deceptive practices.350  
MPHJ filed a motion for a permanent injunction in the District of Nebraska, 
asking that the court “enjoin any further cease and desist orders or 
investigation by the Attorney General regarding the patent enforcement 
activity related to this lawsuit.”351  The judge ruled that the Attorney 
General’s cease-and-desist letter violated MPHJ’s right to send patent 
letters, finding that MPHJ had a constitutional right to “threaten suit for 
infringement.”352  The court preliminarily enjoined the Attorney General 
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from enforcing the cease-and-desist letter unless he could “make a showing 
of bad faith.”353  The court also awarded MPHJ attorneys’ fees.354 
Additionally, in January 2014, New York’s Attorney General reached a 
settlement with MPHJ that forbids the firm from using “deceptive” business 
practices with New York businesses.355  Under the settlement, MPHJ may 
only assert a patent if it has a “good faith basis for [a]sserting the patent” 
and has already conducted “reasonable diligence.”356  MPHJ must also 
describe the alleged infringing activity with “reasonable specificity” and 
identify any party with a financial interest in the patent.357  In a press 
release, the Attorney General’s office noted, “The requirements imposed on 
MPHJ in the settlement should be viewed by other patent trolls as the 
minimum standards that such entities seeking to contact New York 
businesses must follow to avoid liability for unlawful deceptive 
practices.”358 
c.  Anticompetitive Behavior 
Lawmakers and companies have voiced similar concerns about trolls’ 
anticompetitive business tactics.  According to the Coalition for Patent 
Fairness (CPF), because trolls do not use their patents to create products or 
services, “they do not engage in pro-competitive cross-licensing of 
technology to create new products using complementary technologies.”359  
Additionally, trolls wait to threaten suit until a company has invested 
significant resources in its product line or has introduced its product to the 
market.360  The CPF explains the purpose of this tactic:  “Their goal is to 
maximize potential settlement value or damages, so PAEs typically threaten 
or file suit after the defendant has generated a significant revenue stream 
and after the defendant is locked in to the allegedly infringing products and 
technologies.”361  Thus, because an injunction could potentially halt another 
company’s sales, trolls can use the threat of an injunction to their 
advantage.  Further, trolls are immune from the risk of an injunction 
because they do not bring products to the market.362 
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In response to the FTC’s solicitation for public comments after its 2012 
workshop,363 many companies focused their comments on trolls’ 
anticompetitive behavior.  For example, Google, Blackberry, Earthlink, and 
Red Hat prepared a unified submission to the FTC.364  Their comments 
noted the numerous ways that “operating companies and PAEs interact that 
may implicate competition policy and our nation’s antitrust laws.”365  The 
bulk of the comments narrowed in on one worrisome trend:  “the 
outsourcing of patent enforcement by operating companies—companies 
that develop technology and sell products—to PAEs and the competitive 
implications of such activities.”366  Also called “privateering,” this practice 
“amplifies the threat to innovation and competition already posed by PAEs” 
in several ways.367  First, privateering reduces the likelihood that these 
companies will cross-license their patents.368  If an operating company 
outsources its patents to a troll, the troll is then immune from patent 
countersuits, and so it has no incentive to cross-license with another 
operating company.369  Additionally, operating companies work with trolls 
to raise their rivals’ costs.370  For example, they may agree to target only 
direct competitors of the operating company, in turn burdening rivals “with 
additional costs that enable the [operating] company (or its allies) to 
exercise market power.”371  The comments suggest that these “privateering” 
arrangements “transgress the antitrust laws,” subjecting them to a number 
of statutory provisions.372  For one, when trolls acquire patents from 
operating companies, these acquisitions “are subject to [s]ection 7 of the 
Clayton Act, as well as the Sherman Act.”373  Additionally, when trolls and 
operating companies collude to drive up rivals’ costs, these schemes may 
also be “subject to invalidation under Sherman Act [s]ection 1 and [s]ection 
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2.”374  The comments then recommend that the FTC “employ its authority 
under [s]ection 6(b) of the FTC Act . . . to initiate an inquiry into the 
relationship between PAEs and operating companies.”375 
To counteract trolls’ toll on innovation, some companies have publicly 
pledged that they will not assert their patents against people who use them 
to innovate.  In its Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge, Google wrote, 
“Google is committed to promoting innovation to further the overall growth 
and advancement of information technology and believes that Free or Open 
Source Software is a very important tool for fostering innovation.  Google 
is therefore pledging the free use of certain of its patents . . . .”376  In a 
statement accompanying the pledge, Google’s Senior Competition Counsel 
wrote, “Trolls are hurting consumers and are increasingly going after small 
businesses, hampering innovation and reducing competition.”377  Twitter 
also published a patent agreement, promising “not [to] use the patents from 
employees’ inventions in offensive litigation without their permission.”378  
Elon Musk, the CEO of Tesla, made a similar pledge regarding his 
company’s patents, promising that “Tesla will not initiate patent lawsuits 
against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use our technology.”379  Musk 
further elaborated, “Tesla Motors was created to accelerate the advent of 
sustainable transport.  If we clear a path to the creation of compelling 
electric vehicles, but then lay intellectual property landmines behind us to 
inhibit others, we are acting in a manner contrary to that goal.”380  By 
opening up Tesla’s patents, Musk hopes that others will improve upon 
Tesla’s existing product.381  This add-on innovation can help increase the 
sales of electric cars and, thus, put modern transportation on a path toward 
efficiency and sustainability. 
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C.  The Other Side of the Story:  
Patent Trolls Are Not Undermining the Patent System 
Some, however, have a contrary view of the role of patent trolls.  Nathan 
Myhrvold, cofounder of Intellectual Ventures,382 alleges that the danger of 
patent trolls is a myth.383  In an editorial for the Wall Street Journal, 
Myhrvold wrote, “A tiny minority of patent suits are due to bad actors, but 
it’s hardly a crisis.”384  Peter Detkin,385 another cofounder of Intellectual 
Ventures, is one of the most vocal supporters of trolls.  He believes that 
“[e]merging models of patent monetization will help the patent system to 
regain its balance.”386  Detkin suggests that the inequities in the patent field 
arise from the “barriers that small inventors currently face in negotiating 
their licensing deals.”387  He notes that a large portion of inventions in the 
United States come from small companies, not from large corporations.388  
Additionally, R&D at large corporations tends to focus on improving 
existing products, not on creating entirely new products.389 
A small inventor who independently tries to sell his patent to a large 
corporation often faces many obstacles.  Corporations frequently take 
advantage of the inventor’s lack of bargaining power by dragging out 
negotiations and questioning the validity of the patent—even when the 
corporation knows it is valid—just to whittle down the licensing fee.390  
Often, the corporation will engage in months of back-and-forth discussions 
only to decline to license the patent.391  Detkin suggests that it is therefore 
not surprising when these small inventors become frustrated, especially 
when there is “often blatant poaching of [inventors’] supposedly protected 
ideas.”392  Some inventors then turn to litigation and may be “derided as 
‘patent trolls’” as a result.393 
It is here where Detkin’s company, Intellectual Ventures, steps in.  The 
company’s patent-monetization strategies, according to Detkin, help to 
“garner enough resources to work productively with corporations that either 
infringe small inventors’ intellectual property or want to draw on it as a 
source for innovation.”394  According to Detkin, these strategies can help 
small inventors monetize their patents by connecting them with “important 
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commercial partners” and increasing their bargaining power.395  Detkin 
describes the business model of Intellectual Ventures as  “assembling 
portfolios of patents” and “coupl[ing] the portfolios with careful analysis 
and research to create a rational licensing model for managing invention 
rights in markets where products rely on multiple technologies from 
multiple sources.”396  A firm like Intellectual Ventures, Detkin says, can 
promote inventions in various ways.  First, by prescreening patents to 
ensure they are legitimate and relevant to the operations of other companies, 
Intellectual Ventures helps parties reach an agreement more quickly.397  
Second, his company has expertise in licensing negotiations, so its business 
skills bring a unique benefit to the table.398  Third, Intellectual Ventures 
saves inventors from using their valuable time in negotiations.399  Detkin 
notes that this not only saves time for the inventor, but also for the company 
licensing the patent, as Intellectual Ventures “match[es] patent owners with 
patent users.”400  Intellectual Ventures, he says, allows companies to buy 
patents in an efficient manner and license them “at a fair price.”401 
Detkin also criticizes legislative reform efforts, which, in his words, 
typically “would tilt an already unbalanced playing field to further benefit 
large corporations.”402  Like Detkin, Raymond Niro warns of the dangers of 
using legislation to address trolls when “no evidence has been offered that 
patent trolls are a major problem.”403  Niro then suggests that it is not patent 
trolls that are undermining the patent system, but rather members of 
Congress who divert funds from the USPTO.404  Due to this diversion of 
resources, he says, “the pendency of patent applications has increased and 
patent quality has increasingly become suspect.”405 
Niro also identifies an emerging trend, where commentators distinguish 
between manufacturing companies and nonmanufacturing companies.406  
These commentators believe that companies who do not create goods or 
services with their patents should be required to grant licenses—so-called 
compulsory licenses.407  Niro points out that the Constitution does not limit 
the right to obtain and enforce patents to only manufacturing companies.408  
As such, small inventors “should not be forced to grant compulsory licenses 
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because big companies call them ‘patent trolls.’”409  According to Niro, 
compulsory licenses will impose a greater burden on small inventors than 
big corporations.410  He explains that big corporations prefer a compulsory 
license because “it eliminates the threat of an injunction and accordingly 
results in a ‘heads, I win; tails, you lose’ situation.”411  Niro cautions that 
this approach “drips with inequity because an infringer that lost at trial 
should not be treated like [a] willing licensee.”412  Overall, Niro concludes 
that it is the diminishment of small inventors’ rights—not the existence of 
patent trolls—that harms innovation.413 
III.  PATENT REFORM WILL BE MOST EFFECTIVE THROUGH 
THE COMBINED DILIGENCE OF THE FTC AND CONGRESS 
Trolls’ litigation tactics financially burden innovative companies and 
stifle competition.414  Contrary to Detkin’s assertions,415 patent trolls do not 
promote invention.  Detkin insists that Intellectual Ventures protects small 
inventors;416 however, studies and commentary have shown that small 
companies are usually the targets of troll litigation and suffer financial 
hardship due to the high costs of legal defense.417  If the purpose of 
Detkin’s company really is to level the playing field,418 then the targets of 
troll lawsuits would tend to be large corporations rather than the small, 
innovative companies that most often find themselves the victims of patent 
litigation.419 
One approach to curbing patent trolls lies at the intersection of 
intellectual property law and competition law.420  Stricter enforcement of 
antitrust law against patent trolls has the capacity to transform the patent 
field.  Benefits would include a more efficient economy that spawns 
innovation rather than hinders it, better protection for legitimate inventors, 
and less frivolous litigation.  Part III.A proposes that the FTC play a more 
hands-on role in curbing exploitative patent-troll behavior.  Additionally, 
there are several opportunities for reform in the patent system itself that can 
help curb patent-troll abuses.  Thus, it is imperative that Congress address 
those inconsistencies in patent law that trolls manipulate.  Part III.B 
discusses several changes that would deter the assertion of weak patents. 
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A.  Stricter Use of Antitrust Law and Enhanced FTC Involvement 
Will Deter Patent-Troll Abuses 
Antitrust law and patent law have overlapping goals—they both aim to 
foster competition and reward innovation.421  Lawmakers should take 
advantage of the complementary nature of these two bodies of law to police 
trolls more aggressively.422  The Clayton Act and the Sherman Act are 
important antitrust tools that lawmakers can use against trolls now, avoiding 
the delays of new legislation.  The Coalition for Patent Fairness,423 for 
example, advocates that the antitrust authorities assume “a broader role” in 
policing trolls by “deploying their economic expertise and investigatory 
power.”424 
The FTC can—and should—use its authority to combat trolls.425  
Because trolls such as Intellectual Ventures enter into strict nondisclosure 
agreements,426 the FTC is in a unique position to investigate trolls’ business 
practices, with tools at its disposal that are unavailable to others.427  Trolls 
engage in several tactics in an effort to thwart competition.  They assert 
patents aggressively because they have no fear of retaliation and are 
immune from reputational harms.428  While it is somewhat more difficult 
for trolls to capitalize on the fear of an injunction in the post-eBay 
landscape,429 trolls continue to bully defendant companies by threatening 
expensive litigation and forcing target companies to pay licensing fees.430  
Some targets’ only choice is to pay the fee or go out of business.431  Trolls 
often wait to assert infringement claims until the defendant company has 
made a large investment in a product line.432  Once a product has already 
been manufactured and marketed, these product sales are often essential for 
a company to remain viable.  Additionally, trolls strategically burden target 
companies.  They frequently assert legal claims that they intend to drop as 
trial approaches, causing companies to incur discovery and preparation 
costs on weak claims that the troll did not actually expect to pursue.433 
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The FTC should continue to foster settlements with patent trolls; 
however, agreements should be stricter than the MPHJ settlement in order 
to deter other trolls who engage in similar tactics.434  Financial sanctions 
could serve as a warning to trolls that behave anticompetitively.435  The 
FTC also should use its authority under the Sherman and Clayton Acts to 
police privateering.436  The FTC should monitor these types of 
arrangements for possible antitrust law violations—for example, when 
manufacturing companies work with trolls to target rival companies with 
infringement claims and to drive up competitors’ costs.437  Additionally, 
many companies have voiced concerns that privateering reduces the 
likelihood of procompetitive cross-licensing.438  Given that the patent-troll 
business model fails to advance competition, aggressive antitrust 
enforcement is appropriate. 
B.  Patent-Reform Legislation 
Although the Supreme Court ruled on several important patent issues in 
2014, Congress must not lose focus on patent reform.439  There are still 
many areas that Congress should address to realign the patent system with 
its fundamental purpose of promoting innovation.440 
1.  Reform at the USPTO 
Congress should increase funding to the USPTO to decrease the backlog 
of patent applications and expedite post-grant review.441  Taken together, 
these two changes could decrease weak patents in the system at the outset 
and eliminate already-issued weak patents.  Even patent-troll supporters 
believe that Congress must provide more funds for the USPTO.442  
Additionally, increased funding to the USPTO will get to the root of the 
weak patent problem, an issue that the Innovation Act of 2015 ignores.443 
The USPTO’s backlog creates numerous problems—it delays the 
issuance of patents and allows high numbers of weak patents to be issued 
for material that is probably not patentable under the U.S. Code.444  When 
weak patents emerge out of the USPTO, patent trolls have more 
opportunities to assert them against companies who cannot afford the cost 
of a legal defense.445 
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The AIA446 took an important step toward reform of the USPTO by 
instituting post-grant review.447  The Department of Commerce supports 
post-grant review as one remedy for the costs of the USPTO’s backlog 
because it “offer[s] a timely and much less expensive mechanism for 
challenging weak patents.”448  The FTC also has endorsed enhanced post-
grant review.449  The Department of Commerce estimates that post-grant 
review is 50 to 100 times cheaper than patent litigation.450  This can be 
especially helpful for smaller firms that cannot afford patent litigation 
because post-grant review is a more efficient mechanism for challenging 
weak patents.451  For post-grant review to weed out weak patents, the 
USPTO must have sufficient funding to ensure that these proceedings occur 
promptly.  The current wait time at the USPTO is several years;452 if 
Congress provides additional funds for the USPTO to employ more patent 
examiners, it can decrease this wait time.  It will then be easier for small 
companies to secure financing in the early stages of product development 
and minimize the financial loss that is often symptomatic of USPTO 
delays.453 
Another opportunity for reform comes from within the USPTO itself.  In 
rulings like Alice,454 the Supreme Court has instructed the USPTO about 
which patents it may issue.455  To curb the assertion of weak patents, the 
USPTO must stop issuing them in the first place.456  Thus, it is imperative 
that USPTO examiners pay close attention to the Supreme Court’s guidance 
regarding patent validity.  For the Court’s Alice ruling to have any effect, 
examiners should implement the ruling by refusing to issue patents for 
ineligible subject matter.457  If the USPTO follows the Supreme Court’s 
guidance, lower courts should see decreased rates of litigation involving 
low-quality patents. 
2.  Procedural Changes 
The Innovation Act of 2015 and the PATENT Act contain many 
important provisions to combat trolls.458  One important aspect of both bills 
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is the requirement that parties asserting infringement divulge the name of 
any entity with an interest in the patent.459  Trolls’ use of shell companies 
has become a problem.460  Because companies such as Intellectual Ventures 
often consist of hundreds or thousands of shell companies, it is difficult for 
defendants to even identify the parties involved in litigation because trolls 
can hide behind the names of unknown shell companies.  In fact, New 
York’s settlement with MPHJ contained a provision similar to that of the 
Innovation Act of 2015 and the PATENT Act, requiring that MPHJ identify 
any party with a financial interest in its patents.461  Disclosing this 
information will increase transparency in the system and may help 
defendants win attorneys’ fees awards under Octane and Highmark by 
revealing entities with deep pockets.462  If a losing plaintiff cannot pay 
attorneys’ fees, the pending legislation allows courts to impose that 
obligation on parties with a stake in the patent.463  Thus, this provision is 
crucial in helping to deter deceptive troll behavior. 
Additionally, the heightened pleading requirement is an essential tool for 
increasing transparency in patent litigation.464  Currently, a party alleging 
infringement need only name the patent being infringed, which allows for a 
great deal of abuse.465  Vague complaints can leave defendants guessing as 
to which aspect of their business is infringing the patent.  The legislation’s 
heightened pleading standard would require plaintiffs to explain how the 
patent is being infringed on and to provide a list of other complaints it has 
filed regarding the same patent.466  These requirements will give a 
defendant a better idea of the exact claims that the plaintiff has against it.  
Additionally, defendants will be better able to evaluate whether they should 
pay the licensing fee or fight it out in court.  This heightened disclosure will 
decrease the rate of extorted licensing fees.467 
CONCLUSION 
The current patent landscape does not reflect the model that our country’s 
Framers imagined when they created a system that grants property rights to 
inventors for their contributions to society.  By allowing patent trolls to 
exploit inconsistencies in the law, the system taxes the innovation that it 
was supposed to encourage.  Because patent trolls engage in numerous 
anticompetitive business tactics, a more aggressive application of antitrust 
law to trolls is necessary to protect legitimate inventors.  The stricter use of 
competition laws, coupled with important patent reform aimed to address 
various inconsistencies in the law, will put the patent system back on track 
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to fulfilling its goals of fostering innovation and benefiting society through 
technological advancement. 
